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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent willingness of many courts and juries to impose lia-
bility on financial institutions1 has prompted an increasing number
of customers to bring suits against their banks and creditors. These
suits often involve claims for millions of dollars in both compensa-
tory and punitive damages for alleged bank or creditor misconduct.
For example, the Sixth Circuit recently affirmed a jury award of
seven and one half million dollars to a borrower whose lender sud-
denly refused to advance funds under a line of credit agreement.2
In similar cases involving a bank's refusal to lend money under
credit agreements, a California jury awarded approximately
twenty-two million dollars in actual and punitive damages to an
aggrieved borrower 3 and a Maine jury awarded fifteen million dol-
lars in compensatory damages to a borrower.4
One reason for the increasing number of awards in suits
against financial institutions is the expansion of bases for liability
in situations involving banks and creditors. Both the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC or Code) and extensive federal banking
1. For the purposes of this Recent Development, the term "financial institution" will
refer to banks as well as to other types of creditors and lenders.
2. K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985). For a discussion
of Irving Trust, see infra notes 114-25 and accompanying text.
3. Jewell v. Bank of Am., No. 112439 (Sonoma County Cal. Super. Ct. 1985) (appeal
pending), involved a California apple grower who sued Bank of America when the bank
refused to lend funds in accordance with representations made to the borrower. The jury
originally returned a $37 million verdict against the bank, later reduced to $17 million ac-
tual damages and $5 million punitive damages. See Sudo, Court Upholds $22 Million Dam-
ages Against Bank of America in Farm Case, Am. Banker, Oct. 28, 1985, at 1, 23.
4. Ricci v. Key Bancshares of Me., Inc., No. 82-249P (D. Me. Apr. 13, 1987) (jury
trial); see also Ricci v. Key Bancshares of Me., Inc., No. 82-249P, slip. op. (D. Me. Apr. 27,
1987) (considering post-judgment motions and discussing various issues addressed in trial
court); Halvorsen, Cutoff of Credit Costly to Maine Bank, Nat'l L.J., May 4, 1978, at 3, col.
1 (detailing history of the case). Additionally, in Robinson v. Texas Commerce Bank, No.
C-1948-84 (Hildago County Tex. Dist. Ct. 1987), the jury returned a $59.2 million award
against a bank that refused to release a lien on a borrower's property, despite the bank's
knowledge that its lien was invalid. The borrower subsequently declared bankruptcy. The
jury award included $50 million for the borrower's mental anguish.
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regulations provide specific forms of redress for borrowers, debtors,
and bank customers.5 In addition, traditional legal theories such as
breach of contract,6 fraud,7 and duress" are available in actions
against financial institutions. The new generation of suits against
banks and creditors combine reliance on traditional legal theories
with allegations based on innovative or "emerging" theories of lia-
bility.9 The plaintiffs in a recent case, for example, not only
charged their bank with fraud, but also claimed damages for
breach of fiduciary obligation and excessive interference with the
business of the debtor.10
Of the emerging theories of lender or creditor liability, claims
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
5. Article 4 of the UCC, entitled "Bank Deposits and Collections," essentially defines
the rights and liabilities of banks and bank depositors. For example, § 4-207 outlines a
depositor's cause of action against a bank for breach of transfer and presentment warran-
ties. Article 9 of the UCC deals with secured transactions. Federal banking regulations are
primarily contained in 12 U.S.C. §§ 1-3805 (1982), entitled "Banks and Banking."
6. The bank-customer relationship is characterized as contractual. See infra note 108
and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Stirling v. Chemical Bank, 382 F. Supp. 1146, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (hold-
ing that misrepresentations made by bank concerning loans constituted common law fraud),
affid, 516 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1975); Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of Am., 38 Cal. 3d 892, 909, 701
P.2d 826, 838, 215 Cal. Rptr. 679, 691 (1985) (allowing an award for punitive damages
against bank that fraudulently induced debtor to assign all accounts receivable in return for
loan); see also Heiman & Thomas, Impact of Common Law Theories on Lender Recovery
and Liability, in 1 EMERGING THEORIES OF LENDER LIABILITY 17-18 (H. Chaitman ed. 1985).
8. See, e.g., Pecos Constr. Co. v. Mortgage Inv. Co. of El Paso, 80 N.M. 680, 682-83,
459 P.2d 842, 844-45 (1969) (recognizing cause of action for common law duress when lender
refused on date of closing to advance funds unless borrower paid additional sums); cf. Conti-
nental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Stanley, 606 F. Supp. 558, 562 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (re-
jecting claim of duress where bank insisted that borrower sign a guaranty for loan because
no imminent harm posed by bank's conduct); Spillers v. Five Points Guar. Bank, 335 So. 2d
851, 852-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (recognizing cause of action for duress when party
threatens to enforce nonexistent legal rights, but not when party seeks to exert legally en-
forceable rights); First Tex. Sav. Ass'n v. Dicker Center, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 179, 185-86 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1982) (holding that conduct of bank, not financial difficulties of borrower, will
determine exertion of duress). See generally Ebke & Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors:
Toward a Conceptual Framework, 40 Sw. L.J. 775, 786-88 (1986); Heiman & Thomas, supra
note 7, at 18-20.
9. Several authors refer to "emerging" theories of lender liability. See, e.g., Ebke &
Griffin, supra note 8, at 800-17; Burke, Thomas & Warren, Emerging Theories of Bank
Liability, in 462 BANKS AND THEIR BORROWERS: NEW OPPORTUNITIES IN FINANCIAL SERVICES
403 (P.L.I. 1984); 1-3 EMERGING THEORIES OF LENDER LIABILIrY (H. Chaitman ed. 1985).
. 10. See State Nat'l Bank of El Paso v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1984). In Farah, the debtors charged the bank with fraud, duress, breach of fiduciary
duty, and excessive interference with the business of the borrower. The court held the bank
liable on the combined bases of fraud, duress, and interference. Id. For a detailed discussion
of the Farah case see Ebke & Griffin, supra note 8, at 777-82. See also Heiman & Thomas,
supra note 7, at 20-25 (discussing elements of "interference").
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present the broadest foundation upon which to extend the liability
of financial institutions. The concept of implying a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in all contracts derives from statutory
as well as common law sources." The inherent ambiguity of a cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing in bank-customer and creditor-
debtor situations, however, has prompted some commentators to
call the doctrine a "loose cannon" and "interpretive tool" available
to "courts to further their views of justice."'
Recent cases demonstrate acceptance by courts and juries of
the concept of good faith and fair dealing in a variety of suits
against financial institutions. Some courts have expanded their in-
terpretation of the UCC requirements of good faith and fair deal-
ing, particularly with respect to acceleration of debts. As an alter-
native to extending liability under the UCC, many courts now
allow an action in tort for breach of an obligation of good faith and
fair dealing imposed by law on the bank-customer and debtor-
creditor relationships. This newly created tort is significant be-
cause it subjects the deep pockets of financial institutions to possi-
ble punitive damage awards.
This Recent Development explores the judicial application of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the activities
of lenders and creditors with the purpose of formulating standards
by which future lender or creditor liability suits might be assessed.
Part II summarizes the development, general scope, and historical
application of the covenant of good faith to financial institutions.
Part III examines recent cases in which courts have imposed liabil-
ity on banks for the breach of an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Part IV analyzes the legal and commercial impli-
cations of the approaches taken by these courts in applying the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to lender liability suits.
Part V concludes that the trend toward expanding liability
through covenants of good faith and fair dealing in lender and
creditor liability suits will continue with courts applying the doc-
trine on a case-by-case basis.
11. See infra notes 13, 63-64 and accompanying text.
12. Burke, Thomas & Warren, supra note 9, at 458; see also Warren, Good Faith
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, in 1 EMERGING THEORIES OF LENDER LIATmITY 58 (H.
Chaitman ed. 1985).
1200 [Vol. 40:1197
1987] COVENANTS OF GOOD FAITH 1201
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The concept of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing im-
plied in every contract currently enjoys widespread acceptance as a
fundamental principle of contract law.13 Society supports an ex-
pansive definition of good faith in commercial law because the
term itself evokes images of morality, honor, and fair play. 4 Al-
though the implied covenant is recognized by both the common
law and the UCC, neither source provides a comprehensive defini-
tion of the term "good faith."'15 Likewise, commentators and schol-
ars seem unable to agree on clear guidelines for interpreting the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing. 6 The inherent vagueness
of this covenant results in varying applications by courts in differ-
ent contexts, including contractual relations between financial in-
stitutions and their customers.
A. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Imposed on Financial Institutions by the UCC
1. UCC Sections Requiring Good Faith
The UCC contains several provisions concerning good faith.'
7
Section 1-203, entitled "Obligation of Good Faith," states the gen-
13. See, e.g., UCC § 1-203 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
See generally Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good
Faith, 94 HAnv. L. REv. 369 (1980); Eisenberg, Good Faith Under the Uniform Commercial
Code-A New Look at an Old Problem, 54 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1971); Farnsworth, Good Faith
Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U.
CH. L. REv. 666 (1963); Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and
Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982); Summers, "Good Faith" in General
Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV.
195 (1968) [hereinafter Summers, Good Faith in General Contract Law].
14. See Farnsworth, supra note 13, at 669.
15. UCC § 1-201(19) (1978) states that "'[g]ood faith' means honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned." Comment 19 notes that "good faith," when used in the
Code, means "at least" what is contained in § 1-201(19), but also recognizes that certain
sections may impose additional requirements. Id. at comment 19. Section 205 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts simply states: "Every contract imposes upon each party a
duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). Comment d recognizes that a complete definition for
"good faith" is not possible, but attempts to define what constitutes lack of good faith
through examination of judicial decisions. The Restatement's recognition of actions demon-
strating bad faith includes "evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and slack-
ing off, [and] willful rendering of imperfect performance." Id. at comment d.
16. See Farnsworth, supra note 13, at 667-74 (discussing objective and subjective tests
for determining good faith); Summers, Good Faith in General Contract Law, supra note 13,
at 201-02; see also Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 3-10 (summarizing various approaches to
"good faith" taken by scholars).
17. Professor Farnsworth notes that out of over 400 UCC provisions, more than 50
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eral principle: "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."18 More
specifically, Article 1 defines good faith as "honesty in fact";19 this
standard applies to Article 4 banking transactions as well.2" An-
other provision, section 1-102(3), prohibits agreements disclaiming
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but allows a
contract to determine reasonable standards by which the obliga-
tion of good faith will be measured.2"
Commentators' interpretations of the UCC requirements of
good faith vary greatly. Professor Farnsworth argues that the UCC
imposes the obligation of good faith in two distinct categories:
good faith purchase and good faith performance.2 In contrast,
good faith purchase, which includes lack of notice, generally refers
to a party's state of mind in situations such as contract negotia-
tions.23 Good faith performance, however, focuses on "decency,
fairness and reasonableness" in performance or enforcement of the
contract within its terms.2 4 Good faith performance requires the
cooperation of a party so that the other party may "secure the ex-
pected benefits of the contract," measured against objective com-
munity standards.25 Farnsworth defines good faith performance as
the essence of the obligation of good faith imposed on every con-
tract by the UCC.26 In contrast, Professor Summers defines good
faith as simply an "excluder" or "a phrase without general mean-
ing. . . of its own [which] serves to exclude a wide range of heter-
ogeneous forms of bad faith.
'21 7
Courts have applied the requirements of section 1-203 to im-
pose certain obligations on banks and creditors in dealing with cus-
tomers. In Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.28 the Third Cir-
cuit relied heavily on section 1-203 of the UCC to require a credit
agency to notify its debtor prior to foreclosure. The parties had
sections make some reference to "good faith." Farnsworth, supra note 13, at 667.
18. UCC § 1-203 (1978).
19. UCC § 1-201(19) (1978).
20. UCC § 4-103 comment 4 (1978).
21. UCC § 1-102(3) (1978).
22. Farnsworth, supra note 13, at 667-71.
23. Id. at 668.
24. Id. at 671-72.
25. Id. at 672; see also 1 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 1-203:3 (3d ed. 1981) (stating that "what is not regulated by the contract should be done
in such a way as to show good faith in the carrying out of what is expressed").
26. Farnsworth, supra note 13, at 668.
27. Summers, Good Faith in General Contract Law, supra note 13, at 201.
28. 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964).
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executed an agreement under which the credit agency financed the
debtor's purchase of new cars in return for a security interest in
the merchandise. When the debtor experienced financial difficul-
ties, the credit agency assured its customer that an additional loan
would be forthcoming. The creditor, however, foreclosed on the se-
curity without notice. Citing section 1-203, the court stated that
every contract implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing 9
and concluded that the credit agency breached its implied obliga-
tion of good faith.30
Section 1-208, the UCC section dealing with options to accel-
erate a debt, imposes additional obligations of good faith perform-
ance on lenders. This section allows parties to a loan agreement to
provide that the lender may accelerate payments or performance
or require additional collateral "when he deems himself inse-
cure."3 1 However, the UCC allows the creditor to accelerate or re-
quire additional collateral "only if he in good faith believes that
the prospect of payment or performance is impaired."3 2
Courts apply both objective and subjective standards to deter-
mine whether a belief of insecurity was held in good faith. 3 The
creditor must show both that a reasonable person would have ac-
celerated the debt under similar circumstances and that the credi-
tor acted in good faith.3 4 The actor's good faith depends on his
actual mental state. Thus, the lack of factual basis for the credi-
tor's belief in insecurity may be immaterial,35 as might any negli-
29. Id. at 851. The court characterized the question posed by the case as "whether the
assurances given and the reasonable expectations created by [the credit agency] could make
tortious the otherwise proper action of [the creditor] in foreclosing on its security without
notice or opportunity to seek other financing." Id. at 850.
30. Id. (stating that "a jury could not easily avoid the conclusion that it would be
grossly improper and inconsistent with good faith dealing for a secured creditor. . . to per-
sist in assurance that he was about to make further advances ... and then, without notice,
exercise his security rights").
31. UCC § 1-208 (1978).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Sheppard Fed. Credit Union v. Palmer, 408 F.2d 1369, 1371 n.2 (5th Cir.
1969), citing 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 43.4, at 1197
(1965); Blaine v. G.M.A.C., 82 Misc. 2d 653, 655, 370 N.Y.S.2d 323, 327 (Monroe County Ct.
1975) (stating that "[t]he criterion for permissible acceleration under Section 1-208. . . has
the dual elements of whether: (1) a reasonable man would have accelerated the debt under
the circumstances; and (2) whether the creditor acted in good faith"); see also K.M.C. Co.,
Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 760-61 (6th Cir. 1985) (applying the Blaine test for
good faith belief in insecurity). See generally Farnsworth, supra note 13, at 667-74 (discuss-
ing subjective and objective standards).
34. See Sheppard, 408 F.2d at 1371 (placing burden of proof on creditor to show rea-
sonableness of conduct).
35. See Blaine, 82 Misc. 2d at 655-56, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 327.
1987] 1203
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gence in the formation of that belief.36 Consequently, the good
faith of the creditor's belief of insecurity becomes a highly subjec-
tive determination. 7 When assessing insecurity under section
1-208, courts generally require that secured, as opposed to un-
secured, creditors demonstrate more facts prompting the belief of
insecurity.38
The good faith requirements of section 1-208 appear to apply
in the narrow situation in which acceleration occurs because of
creditor insecurity. At least one court, however, extended the prin-
ciples of good faith in section 1-208 to a different set of circum-
stances. In Brown v. AVEMCO Investment Corp.s" the Ninth Cir-
cuit applied section 1-208 to a lender's acceleration of a debt under
a promissory note containing an insecurity acceleration clause
solely because of a technical breach of the parties' agreement.
40
In assessing the lender's acceleration of the debt, the Ninth
Circuit invoked section 1-203 of the UCC, holding that every con-
tract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
More significantly, the court found that section 1-208 applied as
well. The court noted that although AVEMCO's acceleration re-
sulted from a technical default on the agreement, the clause in the
agreement did not provide for automatic acceleration upon default.
The AVEMCO court concluded that because the clause arguably
allowed the creditor discretion to accelerate for any reason, the
good faith requirements of section 1-208 applied to AVEMCO's ac-
celeration according to the official comment, which states that the
36. Id.; see also Van Horn v. Van De Wol, Inc., 6 Wash. App. 959, 497 P.2d 252 (1972).
In Van Horn, a stockholder made several unsecured loans to a corporation. Believing that
the corporation failed to obtain a necessary bank loan, the stockholder deemed himself inse-
cure and accelerated the debt. The court held that the unsecured creditor acted in good
faith because a creditor could consider the overall financial stability of the debtor in deter-
mining prospects of payment without actually checking into the actual financial affairs. The
court stated: "Anything which adversely affected the corporation adversely affected plain-
tiff's prospect of payment." Id. at 961, 497 P.2d at 254.
37. See 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 25, § 1-208:15.
38. See McKay v. Farmers & Stockmens Bank of Clayton, 92 N.M. 181, 585 P.2d 325,
cert. denied, 92 N.M. 79, 582 P.2d 1292 (1978). In McKay, the bank seized property serving
as security for a loan after deeming itself insecure. Although the borrowers defaulted on the
loan, the court found that the value of the security exceeded the outstanding balance on the
note. In addition, the bank had waived previous defaults while the borrowers attempted to
obtain alternate financing. On the basis of these facts, the court found the bank's good faith
in seizing the security questionable. Id. at 183, 585 P.2d at 327.
39. 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979).
40. The agreement gave the lender a security interest in the borrower's airplane. The
borrower technically breached the agreement by leasing the plane without consent and the
lender accelerated the debt. Id. at 1369.
1204 [Vol. 40:1197
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primary purpose behind section 1-208 is to control creditor abuse
of discretion. 1
Read broadly, AVEMCO suggests that the requirement of
good faith should extend to all situations in which the creditor ex-
ercises discretion.42 The court characterized its extension of the
section 1-208 good faith requirement as consistent with the intent
and purpose of the section. Many courts, however, decline to read
section 1-208 broadly enough to impose a covenant of good faith on
accelerations for reasons other than belief in insecurity.
43
While courts generally find the good faith requirement of sec-
tion 1-208 applicable to debts not yet due, most courts reject an
extension of section 1-208 into other areas, particularly the calling
of demand notes by creditors. In Fulton National Bank v. Willis
Denney Ford, Inc.,4 for example, the Georgia Court of Appeals
held that the good faith provisions in section 1-208 are inapplica-
ble to demand notes. The court found that demand notes, by na-
ture, permit a call by the creditor at any time after execution and
that section 1-208 applies only to notes payable at a future date.45
The court rejected the borrower's claim that section 1-203 alone
41. Id. at 1378-79. The UCC comment to § 1-208 provides, in pertinent part, that the
phrase "acceleration at will" does not grant the option at the "whim" or "caprice" of the
creditor. "This Section is intended to make clear that despite language which can be so
construed . . ., the clause means that the option is to be exercised only in . . good faith
belief. . . ." UCC § 1-208 official comment (1978).
42. See AVEMCO, 603 F.2d at 1378-80; cf. California Lettuce Growers v. Union Sugar
Co., 45 Cal. 2d 474, 484, 289 P.2d 785, 791 (1955) (stating that "where a contract confers on
one party a discretionary power affecting the rights of the other, a duty is imposed to exer-
cise that discretion in good faith and in accordance with fair dealing"). Compare K.M.C.
Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 760 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting a parallel between
discretionary acceleration and discretionary demand for payment).
43. See, e.g., Gorham v. Denha, 77 Mich. App. 264, 258 N.W.2d 196 (1977); Fay v.
Marina, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 516 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969); Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 630-31, 224 S.E.2d 580, 587-88 (1976). In Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's
Bank and Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986), the bank called an indebtedness
on its due date and then set off the obligation against the borrower's checking account. The
borrower claimed that the failure of the bank to extend its note constituted an acceleration
in violation of the § 1-208 requirement of good faith. The court rejected this argument,
finding that the good faith requirement of the UCC covered only the performance of the
contract and that the calling of the matured debt transcended performance. Id. at 528. In
addition, the court rejected the borrower's argument that the bank's setoff action consti-
tuted a bad faith acceleration within the meaning of § 1-208. Id. at 528-30. The court also
considered the bank's good faith in demanding additional collateral under UCC § 1-208, but
concluded that the bank made the demand pursuant to a good faith belief in Rigby's im-
paired ability to pay. Id. at 530-35.
44. 154 Ga. App. 846, 269 S.E.2d 916 (1980).
45. Id. at 848, 269 S.E.2d at 918, citing 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 25, § 1-208:2 (2d
ed. 1970).
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imposes an obligation on the bank to act in good faith. The court
acknowledged that section 1-203 requires a party to carry out in
good faith necessary obligations not directly provided for in the
contract, but stated that section 1-208 did not apply because the
date provision in the note expressly regulated the time of
payment.46
In 1985 the Missouri Court of Appeals reaffirmed the princi-
ples of Fulton. In Centerre Bank of Kansas City v. Distributors,
Inc.4 7 the guarantors of a demand note alleged breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith when the bank called the note due
despite the bank's receipt of additional personal guaranties for the
loan.48 At trial, the jury awarded the borrowers and guarantors
over seven million dollars in actual and punitive damages. In re-
versing the decision, the court of appeals cited UCC section 3-122
for the proposition that a cause of action against the maker of a
demand note accrues on the day of execution. The court held that
the good faith requirement of section 1-203 pertains only to per-
formance of a contractual duty and that, because a call for pay-
ment fell within the bank's contractual rights, an imposition of an
obligation of good faith would, in effect, add a new term to the
contract.49
Several Florida cases also implicitly rejected the applicability
of section 1-208 to a bank's. discretionary termination of ongoing
financing arrangements. In Grandin Industries, Inc. v. Florida Na-
tional Bank50 the bank and borrower executed an accounts receiv-
able funding agreement under which the bank agreed to lend
money from time to time at its own discretion. The agreement con-
tained a clause providing for termination by written notice.5 1 Be-
cause the obligation of the bank was discretionary, the court held
that the bank could refuse further funds without breaching the
46. Id. at 848-49, 269 S.E.2d at 918-19; see also Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators, Inc. v.
Peoples Nat'l Bank of Wash., 10 Wash. App. 530, 518 P.2d 734, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 967
(1974). In Allied, the borrower sued the bank-lender, alleging the bank's lack of good faith
in calling due the entire indebtedness on several demand promissory notes. The court held
that under UCC § 3-122 a demand provision in a note renders the debt payable on the date
of execution. Thus, the bank had a right to declare the note due on the day of its choosing,
without actual demand. Id. at 536-37, 518 P.2d at 738.
47. 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
48. The guarantors claimed that the bank made assurances to them that the loan
would be extended. Id. at 48.
49. The court stated that "[t]he Bank could not be required in the name of good faith
to surrender its right under the demand note to call for payment at any time." Id.
50. 267 So. 2d 26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
51. Id. at 27-29.
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COVENANTS OF GOOD FAITH
agreement. Further, the court rejected the borrower's claim that
the agreement implicitly required notice of refusal to lend. The
court found that only complete termination of the agreement, not
refusal to lend on one occasion, would require notice and that no
contractual obligation to continue lending existed.52 The court did
not discuss good faith.
Similarly, in Midlantic National Bank v. Commonwealth
General, Ltd.53 the Florida Court of Appeals rejected a borrower's
claim that his lender improperly terminated funding under a line
of credit arrangement. The borrower alleged that his business col-
lapsed as a result of the bank's refusal to lend. Despite a jury
award of both actual and punitive damages, the appellate court re-
versed, finding that the line of credit carried no obligation to lend
up to the established limit.54 The court found that, without any
written agreement on the terms of the credit, the bank could ter-
minate the agreement at its discretion without liability under sec-
tion 1-208.2
2. Damages for Breach of Good Faith Under the UCC
In addition to defining the extent to which the good faith pro-
visions apply to financial institutions, courts also must determine
the measure of damages for a breach of the covenant of good faith.
The UCC imposes a duty of good faith performance of a contract
within its terms and provides an express remedy for breach of that
duty. UCC section 1-106 states:
The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the end
that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other
party had fully performed but neither consequential or special nor penal
damages may be had except as specifically provided in this Act or by other
rule of law.' 6
Thus, the UCC expressly limits recovery to contract damages for
the breach of the covenants of good faith imposed by sections 1-
203 and 1-208. Contract damages should put the aggrieved party
in as good a position as if the breach had not occurred.57 The UCC
52. Id. at 30. Compare K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759 (6th Cir.
1985) (requiring notice of refusal to lend).
53. 386 So. 2d 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
54. Id. at 33.
55. Id. The court also expressed indifference to the fact that the borrower's business
collapsed as a result of the bank's refusal to lend. Id. at 34.
56. UCC § 1-106(1) (1978).
57. See Rigby, 713 S.W.2d at 536; see also Nobs Chem., U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co.,
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generally does not allow recovery of punitive damages."
Despite this explicit limitation of damages in the UCC, the
Third Circuit in Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.59 upheld
an award of punitive damages against a creditor who foreclosed on
security without notice. The court discussed the reasonable expec-
tations of the parties and inferred that the failure to provide notice
or an opportunity to seek alternate financing constituted a tortious
breach of the obligation of good faith imposed by section 1-203.60
Some state court decisions, however, have rejected the Skeels hold-
ing by expressly denying recovery of punitive damages for breach
of a commercial credit contract.6' While these decisions conclude
that breach of the section 1-203 and section 1-208 obligations of
good faith give rise to only contract damages, other courts now rec-
ognize a cause of action for breach of the obligation of good faith
in tort on the basis of "other law" outside the UCC.
6 2
Inc., 616 F.2d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 1980). See generally, 1 R ANDERSON, supra note 25, § 1-
106:9.
58. UCC § 1-106(1) (1978). While the UCC adopts the general rule that punitive dam-
ages are not recoverable in contract, Professor Anderson notes that exceptions may exist. In
addition, a plaintiff may recover punitive damages in contract if authorized by non-Code
law. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 25, § 1-106:11. See generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14-3, at 520 (2d ed. 1977).
59. 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964). For a discussion of Skeels, see supra notes 28-30 and
accompanying text.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Rigby, 713 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). In Rigby, the court noted
that the Skeels decision was undermined greatly by the holding in Iron Mountain Security
Storage Corp. v. American Specialty Foods, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Pa. 1978), which
according to Rigby, "unequivocally [held] that Pennsylvania does not allow a tort recovery
for breach of a Code contract duty of good faith in an ordinary commercial transaction."
Rigby, 713 S.W.2d at 536 n.12.
62. See, e.g., Rigby, 713 S.W.2d at 537 n.13. The court stated:
Our non-Code, other law, also recognizes a general obligation of good faith and fair
dealing in the performance and enforcement of contracts and implicitly recognizes a
contract remedy for the breach. Our non-Code law does recognize that where the con-
tract places the contractors in a special relationship or status which the law protects,
the breach of the contract obligation of good faith gives rise to an action in tort inde-
pendent of the contract.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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B. Applying the Common Law Implied Obligation of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing to Financial Institutions
1. Creation of the Tort of Breach of Good Faith in the
Insurance Field
In addition to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing im-
posed on contracts within the ambit of the Uniform Commercial
Code, the common laws of many states acknowledge an obligation
of good faith with respect to contracts.6 3 One court stated the com-
mon law principle in terms virtually identical to section 1-203: "It
is not disputed that every contract carries with it an implication
that the parties will act in good faith." '64 Commentators note that
the UCC essentially adopts the common law rule concerning good
faith.65 Both a breach of the UCC's implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing and a breach of the common law obligation gener-
ally give rise to a cause of action in contract.6 6 Courts apply similar
standards in UCC and common law cases to determine what con-
stitutes a lack of good faith, taking into account all of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the contract.6
In contrast to actions for breach of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in contract, courts in a growing number
of states now recognize in certain situations an action in tort for
breach of an obligation to exercise good faith. Suit in tort provides
an attractive alternative to an aggrieved party under a contract. If
the offender's conduct is sufficiently culpable, a plaintiff may re-
cover damages for emotional distress as well as punitive damages.6 8
63. See, e.g., supra note 62; see also Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass.
96, 102, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (1977).
64. Brown-Marx Assocs., Ltd. v. Emigant Say. Bank, 527 F. Supp. 277, 280 (N.D. Ala.
1981), aff'd, 703 F.2d 1361 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Brown v. Los Angeles County Superior
Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949) (stating that "in every contract there is
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that neither party will do anything which
injures the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement").
65. See, e.g., Louderback & Jurika, Standards for Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith
Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 187, 194 n.34 (1982) (tracing the development of com-
mon law concept of good faith and fair dealing in various cases).
66. Id. at 196. The authors discuss several common law cases recognizing a contract,
but not a tort, cause of action for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
67. Id. at 194-95; see also Burton, supra note 13.
68. Most courts hold that a bad faith breach alone will not support an award of puni-
tive damages absent some willful misconduct by the breacher. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank in
Libby v. Twombly, 689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984) (defining level of misconduct necessary to
merit punitive damages awards). For a discussion of Twombly, see infra notes 134-39 and
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According to commentators, the availability of punitive damages
makes a tort suit "extremely attractive to plaintiffs whose compen-
satory damages are relatively insignificant but whose principal
claim is based upon egregious conduct by the other contracting
party. ' 69 In addition, damages in tort actions, as opposed to con-
tract actions, are easier to demonstrate because the rule of Hadley
v. Baxendale70 requires plaintiffs suing in contract to prove reason-
ably foreseeable damages. Thus, lost profits recovery is more likely
in a tort action than in a contract action.71
The tort of breach of an obligation of good faith in contract
developed first in the context of insurance liability. In Comunale v.
Traders and General Insurance Co. 72 an insurance company re-
fused to settle a claim when there was a high risk of a judgment in
excess of policy limits. The Supreme Court of California held that
an action against the insurance company sounded in both tort and
contract. The court reasoned that the insurance company's failure
to consider the best interests of the insured constituted a breach of
the company's obligation of good faith.7 3 The California Supreme
Court reaffirmed and elaborated on its Comunale opinion in Crisci
v. Security Insurance Co.,74 which upheld an award of tort dam-
ages against an insurance company by finding that the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing required an insurer to set-
tle within the policy limits, though the express terms of the policy
did not impose this duty.75 The tort of breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith in the insurance context rests on the premise
that the insurer's obligation does not arise from the contract, but
rather is imposed by law. In Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.
76
accompanying text.
69. Louderback & Jurika, supra note 65, at 205.
70. 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). The rule of Hadley v. Baxendale permits a
plaintiff to recover only general damages flowing from a breach and only those consequential
damages reasonably foreseeable at the time of the contract.
71. See Louderback & Jurika, supra note 65, at 204; Case Comment, Sailing the Un-
charted Seas of Bad Faith: Seaman's Direct Buying Services, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 69
MINN. L. REV. 1161, 1166 (1985), citing Note, Lost Profits and Hadley v. Baxendale, 19
WASHBURN L.J. 488, 506-517 (1980).
72. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
73. Id. at 659, 328 P.2d at 201.
74. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
75. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
76. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); see also Comment, Good
Faith and Fair Dealing in Insurance Contracts: Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 25 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 699 (1974); Comment, An Independent Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in
Insurance Contracts-Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 492 (1974).
Several subsequent California cases also recognized the breach of an implied duty of good
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the California Supreme Court explained this duty imposed by law
by stating that "the insurer's duty is unconditional and indepen-
dent of the performance of plaintiff's contractual obligations.
'77
Even though many jurisdictions now recognize both the im-
plied covenant of good faith in contract and the duty of good faith
imposed by law to allow tort recovery in insurance suits, 78 some
courts still refuse to allow recovery in tort.7 The creation of the
tort of breach of the covenant of good faith in the insurance field
demonstrates that strong public policy on a particular subject,
such as the high expectations of the public when buying insurance,
may cause courts to impose an obligation of good faith and fair
dealing on contracts.8 0 In addition to public policy, courts note
other factors that allegedly make appropriate a recognition of tor-
tious breach of the covenant of good faith in the insurance context.
For example, the superior bargaining position of insurance compa-
nies with respect to the insured" and the fiduciary nature of the
faith in the insurance context as tortious. See, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24
Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1979); Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11
Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974).
77. 9 Cal. 3d at 578, 510 P.2d at 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
78. See Kornblum, Recent Cases Interpreting the Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing, 30 DEF. L.J. 411, 431-32 n.50 (1981) (collecting cases from various jurisdic-
tions recognizing tort action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith in insurance
contracts).
79. See, e.g., Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401, 423, 295
N.W.2d 50, 56 (1980) (declining to follow line of California insurance cases). A number of
jurisdictions rejected an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the insur-
ance context, but then reconsidered. See, e.g., Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313,
319 (R.I. 1980) (holding that the duty of an insurer to act in good faith is implied by law);
A.A.A. Pool Serv. & Supply, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 121 R.I. 96, 395 A.2d 724
(1978) (rejecting an implied-in-law covenant for fire insurance policies). Some jurisdictions
imply the covenant at law for some types of insurance claims, but not for others. See, e.g.,
Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 227 Kan. 914, 611 P.2d 149 (1980) (distinguishing
first party insurance claims from third party claims).
80. See, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 819, 598 P.2d 452, 456,
157 Cal. Rptr. 482, 487 (1979); see also Graham & Luck, The Continuing Development of
the Tort of Bad Faith in Montana, 45 MoNT. L. REv. 43, 45-6 (1984) (discussing the expec-
tations of an insured when buying the policy); Case Comment, supra note 71, at 1176-77.
Louderback and Jurika note that vast numbers of people purchase some form of insurance
and that a breach of good faith by an insurance company thus may affect dramatically the
public good. Louderback & Jurika, supra note 65, at 216-20.
81. See, e.g., Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 820, 598 P.2d at 457, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 487 ("the
relationship of insurer and insured is inherently unbalanced"). Several courts have charac-
terized insurance contracts as contracts of adhesion. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Pacific Mut. Life
Ins., 268 Cal. App. 2d 735, 74 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1969); Fitzgerald v. Aetna Ins. Co., 176 Mont.
186, 577 P.2d 370 (1978); see also Iron Mountain Sec. Storage Corp. v. American Specialty
Foods, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 1158, 1167 (E.D. Pa. 1978). For a discussion of the characteristics
of adhesion contracts, see Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
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duty owed to the insured8 2 may support application of tort princi-
ples to insurance contracts. These factors exist in a variety of con-
tractual situations, but the question remains unclear whether,
under the analysis above, the tort of breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith can be applied to commercial contracts outside
the insurance context.
2. Extension of the Tort to Other Contracts
In Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil
Company of California"5 the California Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that the imposition of an implied-in-law duty of good faith
might interfere with freedom of contract and refused to find the
implied covenant in a commercial contract. The court recognized
that tort damages can be recovered when a party attempts to
shield itself from liability by denying the existence of a contract in
bad faith.8 4 The dissent argued for an extension of the implied cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing based on earlier California de-
cisions and asserted that the reasonable expectations of the parties
to every contract determine what conduct constitutes a tortious
breach. 5 The dissent noted that public policy concerns and rea-
sonable expectations of the parties already had prompted the ex-
tension of tort principles to a California case involving breach of
HARv. L. REV. 1174 (1983).
82. See, e.g., Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 820, 598 P.2d at 457, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 487; see also
Case Comment, supra note 71, at 1182-83 nn.75-78 (discussing the general characteristics of
a fiduciary relationship).
83. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
84. Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363. The court did not decide
whether tort liability could be imposed for breach of the implied covenant of good faith on
the facts, and instead "created" a separate tort for bad faith denial of contract. See Case
Comment, supra note 71, at 1168 (arguing that the Seaman's opinion "created the new tort
... in order to avoid deciding whether to extend tort liability for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith to the commercial context").
85. Seaman's Direct, 36 Cal. 3d at 777, 686 P.2d at 1172, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 368 (Bird,
C.J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that "[w]hile the extent of the duty varies from
contract to contract, the duty itself inheres in every contract") (emphasis in original). Chief
Justice Bird noted in her dissent that while the relationship between parties to an ordinary
commercial contract necessarily differs from that of insurer to insured, a relationship none-
theless exists. Finally, the dissent rejected the danger that extension of the tort of breach of
good faith would make every breach of contract a tort. Chief Justice Bird stated that most
contract breaches do not involve bad faith conduct and that tort liability could not be im-
posed merely for bad faith breach of contract, but only for a failure to meet a duty imposed
ex delicto. According to Chief Justice Bird's analysis, the reasonable expectations of the
parties govern "the determination of what conduct constitutes a tortious breach." Id. at 779,
696 P.2d at 1174, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
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the implied obligation of good faith in the employment context.86
In Tamney v. Atlantic Richfield Co.57 an employee brought suit
against his employer, alleging wrongful discharge and breach of an
implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing, based on
the employer's firing of the plaintiff for a refusal to commit crimi-
nal acts. The court held that tort remedies are available when the
discharge of an employee contravenes the "dictates of public pol-
icy." '88 The court also indicated that the all powerful position of
some employers creates a need for judicial protection of a wrong-
fully discharged employees. Although the Tamney court specifi-
cally avoided the question of whether tort remedies are available
for breach of the implied-at-law covenant of good faith, the major-
ity concluded that the elements of a cause of action in tort would
be identical to those of wrongful discharge. 9 In addition, the court
cited several cases from other jurisdictions extending tort remedies
for wrongful discharge.90
Most courts have been unwilling to follow the broad sugges-
tions made in some California cases that public policy concerns
mandate the imposition by law of an obligation of good faith and
fair dealing in every contract.91 Rather, courts that accept the ap-
plicability of the tort outside insurance cases continue to apply the
insurance analysis in deciding whether to extend the tort of breach
of good faith and fair dealing to other areas.
The fiduciary or "special" quality of the relationship between
the parties to a contract often will be the crucial factor in deter-
mining the availability of tort remedies, even in the insurance con-
tract context. In Farris v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Co., 92 for example, the Supreme Court of Oregon decided a case in
which an insurance company intentionally denied defense coverage
to its insured despite apparent coverage of the claim under the
86. Id. at 775-76, 686 P.2d at 1171, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
87. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
88. Id. at 177, 610 P.2d at 1336, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
89. Id. at 179 n.12, 610 P.2d at 1337 n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846 n.12.
90. Id. at 178, 610 P.2d at 1336, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 845 (collecting cases that recognize
tort actions for employee discharge that contravenes public policy).
91. See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722 (1980), in which a California court held that "[tiermination . . . without legal cause
after such a period of time offends the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing contained in all contracts, including employment contracts." Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at
729. While the opinion seems to suggest that an implied-in-law covenant exists in all con-
tracts, the opinion does not further discuss applicability of the tort outside the employment
area.
92. 284 Or. 453, 587 P.2d 1015 (1978).
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policy. In rejecting the plaintiff's claim for damages due to emo-
tional distress, the court found that no cause of action existed in
tort for failure to pay an insurance claim. The court distinguished
cases allowing tort recovery for failure of an insurance company to
settle within policy limits on the grounds that a settling insurance
company acts in a fiduciary capacity as an attorney representing
the insured's interest in litigation."3 The Farris court reasoned that
the insurance company never undertook the fiduciary obligation to
represent the interest of the insured; rather, the company refused
any responsibility for the claim, constituting only a breach of
contract.94
The Supreme Court of Montana recently has taken the initia-
tive in extending the tort remedy for breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing on the combined bases of public policy,
inequality of bargaining positions, and fiduciary responsibilities. 5
In Dunfee v. Baskin-Robbins, Inc.,96 for example, that court al-
lowed recovery in tort to a franchisee whose justifiable expecta-
tions were frustrated by his fiduciary, the franchisor. The same
court also applied tort principles in Nicholson v. United Pacific
Insurance Co., 91 a case involving breach of a letter of intent to
enter into a lease. The court's analysis focused on the conduct of
the breaching party, rather than the existence of a breach, in up-
holding a jury award of punitive damages.98 Nicholson expressly
rejected the extension of an implied-in-law covenant of good faith
93. Id. at 460, 587 P.2d at 1019.
94. Id. at 468, 587 P.2d at 1023.
95. See, e.g., Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 668 P.2d 213 (Mont. 1983) (imposing
legal duty on employers to act in good faith when dealing with employees); Weber v. Blue
Cross of Mont., 196 Mont. 454, 643 P.2d 198 (1982) (holding that a health service corpora-
tion had a legal duty to act in good faith toward members given the inequality of bargaining
positions); see also Graham & Luck, supra note 80 (discussing development of the tort in
non-insurance cases).
96. 720 P.2d 1148 (Mont. 1986). In Dunfee, the Montana Supreme Court held that
although a franchisor ordinarily does not owe a fiduciary duty to its franchisee, the plaintiff
could obtain a recovery in tort if the franchisor unreasonably frustrated the justifiable ex-
pectation of its franchisee. Id. at 1153. Other cases also have upheld punitive damages
awards in franchise situations. See, e.g., Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704
(7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); Golf W. of Ky. v. Life Ins. Co., 178 Cal.
App. 3d 313, 223 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1986); see also Brown, Franchising-A-Fiduciary Relation-
ship, 49 Tax. L. REv. 650, 664-65 (1971). But see Case Comment, supra note 71, at 1185 n.85
(arguing that a franchisor-franchisee relationship does not give rise to a fiduciary relation-
ship), citing Picture Lake Campground Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 858, 869
(E.D. Va. 1980) and Chmieleski v. City Prods. Corp., 660 S.W.2d 275, 294-95 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983).
97. 710 P.2d 1342 (Mont. 1985).
98. Id. at 1348-51.
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and fair dealing to every contract, but indicated that the law im-
posed such a duty on contracts characterized by adhesion and
inequity.9
3. Implications for Financial Institutions
The issue also arises whether principles underlying the tort of
breach of the implied-in-law obligation of good faith and fair deal-
ing apply to contracts executed by financial institutions. Arguably,
some factors present in banking and credit contracts exist also in
an insurance contracts. 100 The public, for example, certainly de-
mands stability and honesty in both the insurance industry and
the banking system. The heavy regulation of banks and creditors
by the UCC and other federal laws reflects the same public con-
cern as the state regulation of insurance companies.101 In addition,
loan or credit agreements typically contain elements similar to
those found in an adhesion contract for insurance.102
Two early California cases, however, indicate that the law his-
torically imposed no tort duty of good faith on contracts executed
by financial institutions. In Sawyer v. Bank of America10 3 the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals overturned a jury award for punitive dam-
ages against a bank for an alleged breach of its obligation of good
faith. The bank had failed to maintain insurance on the plaintiff's
truck in violation of the terms of an oral agreement. Although the
plaintiff-customer claimed that the bank's breach of the agreement
caused him emotional distress, the court concluded that the bank's
action did not amount to bad faith action extraneous to the con-
tract. Because the law imposed no duty on the bank, the plaintiff
could recover damages only for breach of contract. 04
In Wagner v. Benson'0 5 the same court refused to acknowledge
a bank's failure to disclose information regarding an investment
loan to a borrower as a tortious breach of an obligation of good
99. Id. at 1347.
100. But see Note, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: The Expansion of Tortious
Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Into the Commercial
Realm, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 377 (1986). The author argues that banking contracts readily can
be distinguished from insurance contracts even though some "special factors" are present.
Id. at 398.
101. See supra note 5.
102. See Case Comment, supra note 71, at 1185 n.85 (noting that some bank contracts
fit the model for an adhesion contract set forth in Rakoff, supra note 81, at 1177).
103. 83 Cal. App. 3d 135, 145 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978).
104. Id. at 139, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
105. 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1980).
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faith and fair dealing. The court recognized that a tort could arise
from a borrower-lender relationship, but the majority found that
the bank's action was not tortious.108 The court held that the law
could not impose duties on a lender for problems arising outside
the scope of the contract."0 7
These early decisions imposing no extra-contractual duties on
lenders, adopt the rule that the relationship of bank to depositor
or creditor to debtor is not fiduciary in nature. The contract be-
tween depositor and bank creates a debtor-creditor arrangement
that lacks the qualities of a fiduciary relationship.108 Several fac-
tors, however, might be considered in establishing an implied-in-
law fiduciary relationship. These factors include one party acting
on behalf of the other, the exercise of influence by one party, the
inequality of the parties, and the dependence of one party upon
the other.109 Some cases have found an implied fiduciary duty on
the part of a creditor exercising excessive control over the business
of a debtor, but courts appear unwilling to embrace this position
except in extreme situations."0
Thus far, at least one court has implicitly rejected the exten-
sion of tort remedies to a lender-borrower relationship. In Brown-
Marx Associates, Ltd. v. Emigrant Savings Bank"' the plaintiff
brought suit against a bank for breach of a loan commitment. The
court acknowledged that an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing arising from the contract governed the loan agreement,
but distinguished that covenant from the tort duty of good faith
imposed on a contract by law. The tort duty arises either to fur-
ther some social policy or when the relationship of the parties im-
plies the duty." 2 The court concluded that the law imposed no
106. Id. at 34, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 520-21.
107. The court stated that "[t]he success of the Wagners' investment [was] not a ben-
efit of the loan agreement which the Bank [was] under a duty to protect." Id. at 34, 161 Cal.
Rptr. at 521.
108. See, e.g., Westerly Community Credit Union v. Industrial Nat'l Bank, 103 R.I.
662, 668, 240 A.2d 586, 589 (1968) (stating that "the contract of deposit causes a debtor-
creditor relationship"); see also Case Comment, supra note 71, at 1185 n.85, citing Aaron
Ferer & Sons Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 731 F.2d 112, 122 (2d Cir. 1984).
109. See First Bank of Wakeeney v. Moden, 235 Kan. 260, 262, 681 P.2d 11, 13 (1984).
110. In State National Bank of El Paso v. Farah Manufacturing Co., Inc., 678 S.W.2d
661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), plaintiffs dropped the claim for fiduciary breach because the claim
would have been difficult to prove. See Ebke & Griffin, supra note 8, at 795 n.120. See
generally, Lundgren, Liability of a Creditor in a Control Relationship with Its Debtor, 67
MARQ. L. REv. 523 (1984).
111. 527 F. Supp. 277 (N.D. Ala. 1981).
112. Id. at 283.
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duty on the bank to act in good faith toward its borrower sufficient
to justify the recovery of tort damages for breach of a loan agree-
ment.11 Taken together, these cases demonstrate that, despite
similarities in the activities of creditors and insurance companies,
financial institutions generally have not been subject to tort liabil-
ity for breach of the implied-in-law obligation of good faith and
fair dealing.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co.
The most notable development in the recent trend toward ex-
pansion of lender liability is K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co.11
4
in which the Sixth Circuit affirmed a seven and one half million
dollar jury award against Irving Trust for bad faith breach of a
financing agreement. K.M.C., a grocery retail company, brought
suit against Irving Trust when the bank suddenly refused to ad-
vance funds to the business under a three and one half million dol-
lar line of credit agreement. Under the terms of the financing
agreement, Irving Trust retained a security interest in all accounts
receivable, which the bank required K.M.C. to place in a special
"blocked account" to which the bank had sole access. In March
1982 Irving Trust refused to advance 800,000 dollars to K.M.C.,
despite the fact that this loan would not exceed the three and one
half million dollar limit. Three days after the bank's initial rejec-
tion of K.M.C.'s request, the bank decided to advance the money.
During the intervening period, K.M.C. suffered a loss of credit
standing, and the company collapsed. At trial, the court instructed
the jury that the obligation of good faith implied in every contract
may have imposed a duty on Irving Trust to give notice to its bor-
rower of any refusal to lend under the agreement, unless the bank
made its decision in good faith and in the reasonable exercise of its
discretion. 115 The damages awarded to K.M.C. were based on the
difference between the value of the company in terms of what an
acquirer would pay prior to the company's collapse and the value
of the company after the bank's refusal to advance funds."6
113. Id.
114. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
115. See id. at 759.
116. See id. at 764. The district court opinion upheld the award of damages. See




On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict and up-
held the damage award as "within the reasonable range."11 In con-
sidering whether the trial court's instruction was correct, the court
of appeals first recognized that the "blocked account" procedure
established by the agreement effectively precluded K.M.C. from
obtaining alternate financing. The court further stated that the
"blocked account" mechanism left "K.M.C.'s continued existence
entirely at the whim or mercy of Irving, absent an obligation of
good faith performance." ' 8 Thus, the court concluded that good
faith performance of this financing arrangement required notice of
refusal to lend, unless a valid business reason existed for failure to
give notice. 119 In the court's view, refusal to lend without prior no-
tice constituted an abuse of the bank's wide discretion. In support
of this requirement of notice, the court cited UCC section 2-309
comment 8 dealing with notice of termination of a going
contract.'2 0
Irving Trust cited both Grandin'12 and Midlantic" to show
that the financing agreement did not legally obligate the bank to
advance funds. The court, however, distinguished these Florida
cases because neither examined a good faith limitation on the
bank's discretion. In addition, the Sixth Circuit emphasized Irving
Trust's inordinate amount of control over K.M.C. and the estab-
lished course of dealing between the parties.
The court next considered Irving Trust's claim that the de-
mand provision in the financing agreement allowed the bank to de-
mand repayment of the entire loan at any time and to refuse to
lend further amounts. Citing both Brown v. AVEMCO12 3 and UCC
section 1-208, the court stated that a bank's power to demand re-
117. The court upheld the jury award, concluding that the proper measure of damages
equaled the difference between the K.M.C.'s value prior to the bank's negative decision and
the value of the company on the market after the decision. The court found the testimony
of several experts an acceptable basis upon which to compute the approximate values.
Irving Trust, 757 F.2d at 763-66.
118. Id. at 759.
119. Id. Jewell v. Bank of Am., No. 112439 (Sonoma County Cal. Super. Ct. 1985),
pending on appeal, may present similar arguments for liability. The counterclaim asserted
fraud, as well as breach of good faith. See Sudo, supra note 3.
120. Irving Trust, 757 F.2d at 759. UCC § 2-309 comment 8 pertains to sales contracts
and states: "the application of principles of good faith and sound commercial practice nor-
mally call for such notification of the termination of a going contract relationship as will
give the other party reasonable time to seek a substitute arrangement."
121. For a discussion of Grandin, see supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
122. For a discussion of Midlantic, see supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
123. For a discussion of AVEMCO, see supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
1218 [Vol. 40:1197
COVENANTS OF GOOD FAITH
payment, like its discretion over whether to advance loans, is lim-
ited by an obligation of good faith performance. According to the
court, the demand provision acted as a type of acceleration clause,
on which the UCC and the courts impose obligations of reasonable-
ness and fairness.12 The majority then determined whether Irving
Trust exercised good faith in refusing to lend money to K.M.C.
without notice, applying both objective and subjective standards to
ascertain whether the bank's employee believed in good faith that
K.M.C.'s financial difficulties jeopardized the loan. Although the
evidence conflicted as to whether K.M.C.'s financial condition was
actually worsening or improving, the court found that Irving Trust
previously had monitored the company and was well aware of its
difficulties. Finding also that Irving Trust was not faced with a
sudden crisis on the date of the refusal, the court held that a jury
could have determined that no reasonable loan officer would have
refused a loan request under similar circumstances. 12 5
B. Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank
In Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Banks26 a
bank appealed from a judgment in favor of its customer, Commer-
cial Cotton Company. The customer brought suit after the bank
negligently paid two checks containing unauthorized signatures
and then refused to recredit the account. The judgment awarded
Commercial Cotton 4000 dollars for the negligent payments, 20,000
dollars for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 100,000
dollars in punitive damages for breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing implied in the contract between a bank and
its depositor.
127
On appeal, the California Supreme Court upheld the awards
for negligent payment and breach of the covenant of good faith,
but reversed the award for infliction of emotional distress. 28 The
court acknowledged that the tort of breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing could be applied in cases outside of the in-
surance contract context. 12 The court also emphasized that Sea-
124. 757 F.2d at 760.
125. Id. at 762-63 (stating that "generally there was ample evidence. . . that March 1
simply was not that unusual a day in the history of the relationship between Irving and
K.M.C."). Id. at 762.
126. 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985).
127. Id. at 514-15, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
128. Id. at 516-17, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554-55.
129. Id. at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
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man's Direct did not expressly preclude application of the doctrine
to ordinary commercial contracts. 130
The court recognized similarities between insurance contracts
and contracts between a bank and its customers. First, the court
noted that the government regulates the banking system as heavily
as the insurance industry. Notwithstanding these protections, the
bank customer relies almost exclusively on the financial institu-
tion's "honesty and expertise" in handling funds.13" ' Furthermore,
the bank stands in a superior bargaining position in relation to its
customer. Finally, the court noted that the banking system, like
the insurance industry, provides "vital public services substantially
affecting the public welfare."' 32 Thus, the court held that the rela-
tionship of bank to depositor is "at least quasi-fiduciary"' 3 3 and
that, as a result of this relationship, the bank's behavior consti-
tuted a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing im-
posed by law.
C. The Montana Cases
1. First National Bank in Libby v. Twombly
In First National Bank in Libby v. Twombly 34 a bank
brought suit to recover a deficiency judgment on a promissory note
and security agreement. The borrowers defaulted on the loan pay-
ments, but negotiated a restructuring of the loan with a bank agent
who failed to inform the bank officers. Later, the bank without no-
tice accelerated the entire debt and offset the outstanding obliga-
tion against funds in the borrower's checking account. The bank
brought suit for the balance owing on the note. The borrower, how-
ever, counterclaimed that the bank previously had assured him
that the loan would be refinanced and that the acceleration
breached the bank's implied covenant of good and fair dealing. 13 5
The jury found that the bank breached its good faith obligation in
accelerating the debt, but awarded only 4000 dollars in compensa-
tory damages.'
130. Id. For a discussion of Seaman's Direct, see supra notes 83-86 and accompanying
text.
131. Commercial Cotton, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984).
135. Id. at 1228-29.
136. Id. at 1227.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of Montana concluded that the
issue of punitive damages should have been submitted to the jury.
The court began its analysis by noting that Montana's version of
the UCC, particularly section 1-208 on acceleration at will, applied
to the transaction in question. The court, however, warned that the
case presented a rather unusual fact situation.13 7 Although the jury
found that the bank violated the statutorily imposed good faith
provisions of sections 1-203 and 1-208, the jury did not consider
punitive damages.
Without any substantial elaboration, the court stated that
when the duty to exercise good faith is imposed by law rather than
the contract itself, the breach of that duty is tortious."'8 Under the
court's analysis, punitive damages for a tortious breach of a statu-
tory obligation would be recoverable only when the conduct of the
breacher is "sufficiently culpable," or where "malice, oppression or
fraud" motivates that conduct. 39 The court concluded that, on the
basis of the evidence presented, the jury could have found that the
bank acted in sufficiently reckless disregard of the borrower's
rights to support an award of punitive damages.
2. Tribby v. Northwestern Bank of Great Falls
In Tribby v. Northwestern Bank of Great Falls40 the Mon-
tana Supreme Court applied its Twombly analysis to another
lender liability suit. In Tribby a depositor brought suit against its
bank, alleging wrongful payment on checks drawn on a partnership
account that did not contain two authorized signatures. In addi-
tion, the depositor claimed that the bank, in breach of its obliga-
tion to act in good faith, subsequently refused to make personal
loans in retaliation for the suit brought on behalf of the partner-
ship."' The jury awarded 119,000 dollars in compensatory
damages.
Although the appellate court did not indicate whether the
UCC or some other statute imposed a good faith obligation on the
bank, the Tribby opinion indicated that punitive damages were
properly recoverable.1 42 The court noted that while Twombly sup-
137. Id. at 1230.
138. Id.
139. Id. Courts generally hold that plaintiff must show culpable conduct to recover
punitive damages.
140. 704 P.2d 409 (Mont. 1985).
141. Id. at 413.
142. Id. at 419.
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posedly presented a unique case, similar factors, such as the supe-
rior bargaining power of the bank, allowed the jury to find that the
bank acted in reckless disregard of customer rights. The court,
however, carefully limited its holding by saying that the opinion
did not extend the obligation of good faith implied by law to every
contract.
143
3. Central Bank of Montana v. Eystad
In Central Bank of Montana v. Eystad"' the Montana Su-
preme Court considered another claim against a bank for breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The bank and the bor-
rowers had executed a loan, which the bank extended several times
on the condition that the borrowers substantially reduce the total
amount owed. Subsequently, the bank refused to further extend
the due date for the loan and foreclosed on parcels of land that
served as security for the debt. The parties had an established bus-
iness relationship, and the borrowers claimed that the "course of
conduct" in extending the loan estopped the bank from foreclos-
ing. According to the borrowers, foreclosure breached the bank's
obligation of good faith and fair dealing owed to its customer. 4 5
The court affirmed a finding for the bank by stating that Cen-
tral Bank was not bound by an implied-in-law covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, but was bound by the obligation of good
faith, defined as honesty in fact and imposed on every contract or
duty within the Uniform Commercial Code.' 46 The court concluded
that the bank had acted candidly and reasonably so that even if an
implied-in-law covenant of good faith had existed, it would not
have been breached by the bank on these facts. The court further
stated that breach of a statutory covenant imposed by section 1-
203 would not support an award of punitive damages absent a
showing of malice, fraud, or oppression.1
47
IV. ANALYSIS
A close reading of the recent cases applying some concept of a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to banks and creditors
demonstrates a judicial dilemma. Courts recognize the potential for
143. Id.
144. 710 P.2d 710 (Mont. 1985).
145. Id. at 713.
146. Id. at 714.
147. Id.
1222 [Vol. 40:1197
COVENANTS OF GOOD FAITH
abuse in bank-customer and creditor-debtor relationships and at-
tempt to reach correct results by means of good faith. Courts strive
also to follow precedent and to avoid an overly broad interpreta-
tion of implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing in commer-
cial contracts. Furthermore, in applying either UCC or common
law principles of good faith, courts often must choose between the
competing policies of compensating plaintiffs and preservation of
the freedom of contract in the banking and credit context.
A. Evaluating Judicial Application of the UCC Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Financial Institutions
In K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co.148 the Sixth Circuit be-
gan its analysis by noting that section 1-203 of the UCC imposed a
duty on Irving Trust to act in good faith toward K.M.C. in carry-
ing out the spirit of the credit arrangement. Although the agree-
ment did not expressly provide for notice, the covenant of good
faith arising from the contract required that notice be provided to
the borrower of refusal to lend consistent with the spirit of the
bargain. Thus, the court imposed a notice requirement that al-
lowed the covenant of good faith and fair dealing under the UCC
to mandate conduct necessary for carrying out the expressions of
the parties. 49
In addition, the Sixth Circuit indicated that Irving's ability to
call the loan as a type of demand note would be subject to the
good faith limitations of section 1-208.150 Based on these limita-
tions, the court rejected Irving's argument that because the credit
arrangement contained a demand provision, the bank had the au-
thority to demand payment at any time, which necessarily involved
a refusal to lend further funds. The court apparently adopted a
good faith requirement for the calling of the demand note as well
as for the lender's refusal to advance funds. 51 Thus, the Sixth Cir-
cuit appeared to apply a two-tiered analysis to the bank's decision,
using sections 1-203 and 1-208 to uphold the award for contractual
damages.
152
148. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985). For a discussion of Irving Trust, see supra notes
114-25 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
150. But see supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
151. 757 F.2d at 760. Although the court cited UCC § 1-208 and AVEMCO in support
of its ruling that Irving's call of a demand note would be limited by § 1-208, the official
comment to § 1-208 expressly exempts demand notes.
152. Id. at 763-66. The award was based on the difference between the value of
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Subsequent cases have explicitly rejected the Sixth Circuit's
apparent application of the section 1-208 requirements of good
faith to the calling of a demand note. In Flagship National Bank
v. Gray Distribution Systems, Inc.'53 a Florida court reversed a
jury award of 3.2 million dollars in punitive and compensatory
damages against a bank that refused to continue loans under a fi-
nancing arrangement. The court, citing Grandin and Midlantic,
found that the financing arrangement created no obligation on the
bank to continue funding.15 4 Moreover, the court refused to follow
Irving Trust, calling the Sixth Circuit's imposition of obligations of
good faith on demand notes "suspect."' 55
The bankruptcy court in In re Red Cedar Construction Co.'
56
declined to interpret Irving Trust as imposing the section 1-208
good faith requirements on all demand notes. Rather, the court ex-
plained that the agreement in Irving Trust created an irrevocable
commitment by Irving to lend funds as long as an express agree-
ment existed and the borrower objectively qualified for the loan. 57
In contrast, a true demand note would create only a revocable
commitment to lend, and the good faith principles of 1-208 would
not apply.158 Thus, the bankruptcy court concluded that the Sixth
Circuit merely adopted good faith standards comparable to those
used in application of section 1-208 for future advances when the
commitment to lend is irrevocable and the bank has an obligation
to lend to a qualified borrower. Under the bankruptcy court's anal-
ysis, a lender would breach the obligation of good faith only by
failing to make a loan under an irrevocable loan commitment to a
borrower objectively qualified for a loan. The bankruptcy court in-
terpreted the Irving Trust's requirement of notice to be inapplica-
ble to situations in which the debtor's ability to pay or perform is
in fact impaired. 5 9
K.M.C. as a going concern before the bank's refusal to lend and the company's value after
the refusal. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
153. 485 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
154. Id. at 1340. The court found that good faith could not be invoked to override
express terms of a contract.
155. Id. at 1341.
156. 63 Bankr. 228 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986).
157. Id. at 237.
158. Id. at 238 n.7. The bankruptcy court concluded that the funding arrangement in
Irving Trust was an irrevocable commitment to lend because the Sixth Circuit rejected a
suggestion that the demand provision in the agreement gave Irving Trust the right to refuse
to lend without notice. The bankruptcy court focused its analysis on the existence of a writ-
ten agreement between Irving Trust and K.M.C. Id. at 237-38.
159. Id. at n.8.
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The bankruptcy court, ignoring several important implications
of the Sixth Circuit's opinion, refused to place a good faith obliga-
tion to provide notice on a lender who refused to advance funds.
Although correctly interpreting the Sixth Circuit's adoption of
good faith requirements for future advances, the bankruptcy
court's analysis removes a good faith obligation of notice in most
refusals to lend because many credit arrangements are revocable.
In addition, notice would be excused when the creditor could not
demonstrate "objective creditworthiness"-a determination that
under Irving Trust should be made in good faith.
An alternative interpretation to the Sixth Circuit's application
of good faith principles, contrary to the view taken by Flagship,6"
is that Irving Trust should not be read to extend section 1-208 to
refusals to lend. Rather, the Sixth Circuit merely recognized the
obligation to act in good faith under section 1-203 and then deter-
mined that notice of refusal and good faith belief in insecurity
were necessary to carry out the spirit of the bargain agreed to in
the particular contract signed by the particular parties. 6' In Irving
Trust the Sixth Circuit faced a unique situation in which the use
of a blocked account gave the bank extraordinary discretion. The
bank's grant of a loan three days after its initial refusal suggests
that the initial refusal may have been in bad faith. Thus, the court
applied section 1-203 to require notice of refusal as well as good
faith in the bank's decisionmaking, to be measured not under sec-
tion 1-208 itself, but under standards similar to those employed by
courts considering good faith in the acceleration context.
The latter interpretation of Irving Trust arguably reads obli-
gations of good faith into agreements for all lines of credit in which
the lender retains discretion over the advance of funds. This read-
ing might be supported by the Sixth Circuit's reference to Brown
v. AVEMCO,'6 ' in which the Ninth Circuit implicitly suggested
that the section 1-208 requirements always should apply to acceler-
ations initiated at the option of the creditor. It seems unlikely,
however, that courts would follow such a sweeping limitation on
loan agreements expressly discretionary in nature, especially when
these agreements clearly represent the expectations of both par-
ties. The issue arises whether a court may use section 1-203 to im-
ply additional good faith requirements to a contract that expressly
160. For a discussion of Flagship, see supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
162. 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979). For a discussion of AVEMCO, see supra notes 39-
43 and accompanying text.
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delineates the rights and obligations of the parties concerning good
faith and notice of refusal to lend. 6 ' The court in Irving Trust did
not address whether parties could, in effect, preclude a court from
requiring notice by addressing it in the contract. If Irving Trust is
read as a contract case, authority exists in certain franchise con-
tract termination cases that by analogy would allow banks to avoid
the Irving Trust dilemma through skillful contract drafting.16 4 Re-
gardless of which interpretation prevails, Irving Trust stands for
the proposition that section 1-203 confers upon the courts the
power to imply obligations of good faith into ambiguous agree-
ments. Irving Trust also may signal an increased willingness by
courts to hold banks and creditors to higher standards.
In Irving Trust the Sixth Circuit also confronted the dilemma
of how to award damages to the aggrieved borrower who lost an
entire business as a result of the bank's misconduct. The UCC lim-
ited the court to an award of contract damages, an award that
would put K.M.C. in as good a position as if the bank had per-
formed. By upholding the difference in value between the worth of
K.M.C. before and after the bank's breach of the covenant as the
proper measure of damages, the court, in effect, compensated
K.M.C. for future profits, which courts generally hold too uncer-
tain to prove with the accuracy needed to justify an award in
contract. 6 '
Some commentators suggest a modification of traditional con-
cepts of contract damages as a solution to the problem of cove-
163. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Division of Triple T Serv., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 720, 304
N.Y.S.2d 191 (1969), aff'd without opinion, 34 A.D.2d 618, 311 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1970). In Divi-
sion of Triple T, the franchisee sought an injunction preventing the franchisor from termi-
nating the franchise agreement. The franchise contract expressly allowed termination of the
agreement by either party at the end of an original three-year period or at the end of any
three-year renewal period by written notice given 90 days before the desired termination.
The contract also allowed the franchisor to terminate on 30 days' notice during the first year
of the agreement. 60 Misc. 2d at 722, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 194. At the end of the original three-
year term, the franchisor notified the franchisee of termination by the franchisor due to
"inadvisability" of renewal. Id. The franchisee claimed that the termination lacked the good
faith required in the performance of every contract under the UCC. Although the New York
court recognized that a franchisor often possesses superior bargaining power in dealing with
a franchisee, the court held that the UCC imposed no obligation on the franchisor to act in
good faith when terminating the franchise agreement according to the terms of the contract.
The court simply stated that "unless the termination clause be deemed unconscionable
there is no implicit requirement that it be exercised other than as provided for in the con-
tract." Id. at 729, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
165. See supra note 71.
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nants of good faith in the banking context.' These writers pro-
pose that in extraordinary circumstances, such as in Irving Trust,
a plaintiff should receive adequate compensation by means of ad-
justed contract damages that would depend on such circumstances
as willful misconduct. In these cases, the bank would not be able to
escape excessive monetary awards by hiding behind the protection
of ordinary contract damages. This approach would preserve the
principles of freedom of contract and "efficient breach" of com-
mercial contracts 167 and would protect the banking and credit sys-
tem from uncontrolled punitive damage awards.
B. Evaluating Judicial Extension of the Tort of Breach of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Financial Institutions
The sporadic application of the tort of breach of an implied-
at-law duty of good faith and fair dealing in banking and credit
situations suggests that courts are taking an ad hoc, even cautious,
approach. Courts increasingly recognize that bank and credit con-
tracts may create a special relationship between the parties. Irving
Trust, for example, could be read to imply that, as a result of the
blocked account procedure, the bank stood in a quasi-fiduciary re-
lationship to its borrower.6 8 This special or quasi-fiduciary rela-
tionship justifies judicial protection only in extraordinary
situations.
Courts have not characterized the bank-customer relationship
as fiduciary in nature, but at least one case, Commercial Cotton v.
United California Bank,6 9 demonstrates the willingness of Cali-
166. See, e.g., Case Comment, supra note 71, at 1186-96. The author of the case com-
ment recognizes that simple contract damages may not provide adequate compensation
when a breach of contract occurs in bad faith, yet asserts that rationales for allowing tort
damages, such as deterrence of misbehavior, do not exist in commercial contract situations.
The author argues for a modification of ordinary contract damages on a case-by-case basis,
involving such steps as relaxation of proof required for lost profit recovery. Id. at 1193; see
also Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: When, If At All, Should It Be
Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions?, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 425, 443 (1981) (arguing for
greater sanctions for a willful breach of contract only as a method for leaving contract prin-
ciples intact); Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for
Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REv. 1443, 1476-77 (1980) (suggesting "supercompensatory"
damages for some breaches of contract, including those occurring in bad faith).
167. The concept of an efficient breach of contract gives the breacher justification for
nonperformance of an economically undesirable contract. See Diamond, supra note 166, at
433 (stating that efficient breach is a judicially accepted principle of contract law).
168. See K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 1985).
169. 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985). For a discussion of Commercial
Cotton, see supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text; see also Seaman's Direct Buying
Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354
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fornia courts to recognize the ordinary bank-customer relationship
as a special one. Commercial Cotton characterized the bank con-
tract as an object of public concern because of widespread effects
and the dependence of ordinary depositors on the expertise of the
bank in handling funds. Moreover, bank deposit contracts are not
bargained for, and most credit arrangements contain elements of
adhesion. As a matter of social policy, therefore, some courts may
compensate plaintiffs and punish banks through awards of puni-
tive damages.
While California appears on the brink of requiring banks to
act in good faith in all situations, other states, such as Montana,
recognize the danger of extending this tort to all banking relation-
ships. The Montana Supreme Court, on facts the court termed
"unique," allowed tort damages against a bank in First National
Bank in Libby v. Twombly 17° on the basis of a section 1-203 cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. The court apparently over-
looked or ignored the express limitation of damages for breach of a
UCC duty contained in section 1-106.11' Despite the supposed
unique characteristics of the fact situation in Twombly, the same
court again held the tort of breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing applicable to a financial institution in Tribby
v. Northwestern Bank of Great Falls.7 2 In Tribby, however, the
court did not identify the source of this implied-at-law covenant
and specifically rejected the opportunity to extend the tort for
breach of good faith to every contract.
In Central Bank of Montana v. Eystad7 3 the Montana Su-
preme Court abruptly backed away from its apparent trend toward
incorporation of tort principles for breach of an implied-at-law
covenant of good faith in all contracts involving financial institu-
tions. Eystad, however, presented a fact situation similar to both
Twombly and Tribby, which involved ordinary customers pro-
testing unilateral action taken by their bank. In Eystad the bank
foreclosed on security after refusing to extend a loan. Similarly,
Twombly involved the acceleration of a debt. In Eystad, however,
(1984) (characterizing a "special" relationship as one deserving of judicial protection);
Robinson v. Texas Commerce Bank, No. C-1948-84 (Hildago County Tex. Dist. Ct. 1987)
(jury determination that relationship between the bank and its customer was "special").
170. 689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984).
171. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
172. 704 P.2d 409 (Mont. 1985). For a discussion of Tribby, see supra notes 140-42
and accompanying text.
173. 710 P.2d 710 (Mont. 1985). For a discussion of Eystad, see supra notes 144-47
and accompanying text.
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the court refused to acknowledge a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing other than the one arising from the contract under the
UcC.
Arguably, both Twombly and Tribby involved a degree of cul-
pable behavior by the banks. In Twombly the bank foreclosed and
accelerated the debt despite assurances that the loan would be refi-
nanced. Similarly, in Tribby the customer alleged that the bank
consciously refused to make personal loans in retaliation for a suit
initiated on a separate matter by the same applicant. In Eystad
the court found the bank's refusal to extend the date of the loan
and subsequent foreclosure plainly within the bank's rights. Thus,
the Eystad court ignored the bank's previous extensions and chose
not to characterize the bank's action as sufficiently culpable to
warrant tort damages.
The Montana cases involving financial institutions represent
the broad judicial discretion exercised by courts in applying the
tort of breach of good faith. As Twombly, Tribby, and Eystad
demonstrate, courts often will engage in line-drawing between rela-
tive degrees of misconduct by financial institutions and refuse to
extend the tort wholesale to all banking and creditor relationships.
The ad hoc application of the tort of breach of an implied-at-law
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is based on the recognition
that traditional contract damages may be inadequate compensa-
tion for some bank and credit customers.174 The high cost of litiga-
tion and the difficulty of proving contract damages may deter
plaintiffs, especially the average bank customer, from bringing
suits. This deterrence would grant financial institutions the license
to abuse their superior bargaining position.175 Thus, Twombly and
Tribby may evidence a judicial desire to protect a special type of
commercial contract between an unsophisticated consumer and a
bank.
On the other hand, several arguments have been proposed
against the extension of this tort to contractual financial dealings
between businesses and creditors. First, the principle of freedom of
contract between parties of equal bargaining power underlies all
commercial contracts, and the imposition of additional obligations
may be unnecessary. Second, application of tort principles to a
breach of contract essentially eliminates the concept of an efficient
174. See supra note 166.
175. See Diamond, supra note 166, at 451 (suggesting that in transactions involving
consumers, expenses of litigation might exceed the damages recovered so that consumers are
less likely to bring suit and bad faith breach is encouraged).
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breach. Third, allowing tort damages might encourage frivolous lit-
igation by businesses looking for a way to recover economic
losses. 176 Finally, the possibility of punitive damages in the com-
mercial context threatens the stability and soundness of the bank-
ing system. 17 Some argue that banks, like insurance companies,
could pass on large punitive damage awards to the public as a cost
of doing business. The potentially staggering liability, however,
could result in both bank failures and an undesirable tightening of
credit."'
Thus, courts allowing tort recovery for an implied-in-law cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing in cases involving the liability
of financial institutions arguably have set a dangerous precedent.
With the exception of California, however, most state courts con-
tinue to reject the application of this tort to banks and creditors.
The Montana cases, on the other hand, demonstrate that some
states will apply the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but on
an ad hoc basis.
V. CONCLUSION
In Irving Trust the Sixth Circuit approached the issue of lia-
bility under the UCC by interpreting the "spirit" of a loan agree-
ment as imposing obligations of good faith on the bank. The court
was within its authority to find that the nature of the contract re-
quired notice and good faith decisionmaking. The court's innova-
tive method of computing the contractual damage award, however,
stands as an ominous precedent for courts that are unwilling to
impose a tort duty on banks on the basis of a covenant of good
faith. The UCC duty of good faith in contract, therefore, is a pow-
erful tool that courts increasingly may apply to banks and credi-
tors in particularly egregious circumstances because of public con-
cern over the control of financial institutions. In a similar vein,
courts that recognize the tort of breach of good faith in the law of
176. See id. at 449.
177. See Ebke & Griffin, supra note 8, at 800-05.
178. Id. at 801 n.155. The authors include excerpts from the Amicus Curiae Brief for
the Missouri Bankers Association in Support of Appellant-Respondent Centerre Bank of
Kansas City, N.A., reprinted in 2 EMERGING THEORIES OF LENDER LIABILITY 1195-96 (H.
Chaitman ed. 1985). The Association argued that
loose application of an undefined and unlimited liability theory ... could wreak havoc
on the ability of... banks to make proper evaluation. Thus, faced with uncertain risks
and potentially enormous liability. .. banks likely will be forced to change the terms
and increase the cost at which financing is made available to ... borrowers.
Id.
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insurance contracts may apply the same concepts to banking con-
tracts. Most courts are unlikely to extend the tort to all cases in-
volving financial institutions, but extraordinary circumstances may
prompt courts to allow plaintiffs recovery in tort.
Common law and UCC concepts of good faith and fair dealing
have been recognized for some time. As applied to financial institu-
tions, however, these concepts are indeed potential loose cannons
of liability. Courts will invoke these concepts on a case-by-case ba-
sis. While courts apparently will not apply the doctrines to every
case involving a financial institution, the power of courts to invoke
the concept of good faith as a basis for large damage awards should
concern banks and creditors alike.
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